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Abstract
Decision makers in the ¯eld of national security, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
are faced with an uncertain, adaptive and asymmetrical threat. It should come as no surprise
that a great need exists to understand covert organizations, the structure of which becomes
known partially only after an attack or operation has occurred. What is known however is
that many covert networks are organized in compartmentalized cellular structures. To better
understand these cellular structures we model and analyze these cells as a collection of subsets
of all participants in the covert organization, i.e., as hypergraphs or a±liation networks. Since
terrorist cells can be viewed as graph theoretical cliques, i.e., everybody in the cell knows
everybody else, such a covert a±liation network structure is analyzed by evaluating the one-
mode projection of the corresponding hypergraph. First we provide a characterization of the
total distance in the one-mode projection using its corresponding cell-shrinked version. Secondly
we evaluate the one-mode projection with respect to the secrecy versus information tradeo®
dilemma every covert organization has to solve. We present and analyze a±liation networks
representing common covert organizational forms: star, path and semi-complete hypergraphs.
In addition we evaluate an example of a covert organization wishing to conduct an attack
and compare its performance to that of the common covert organizational forms. Finally we
investigate a±liation networks that are optimal in the sense of balancing secrecy and information
and we prove that among covert organizational forms in the class of hypertrees with the same
number of cells uniform star a±liation networks are optimal.
Subject classi¯cations: Terrorism; Counterinsurgency; Intelligence; Defense; Covert networks; Af-
¯liation networks.
Area of review: Military and Homeland Security.
JEL Classi¯cations: C50, C78
1 Introduction
In decision making aimed at confronting covert organizations managers are faced with high-level,
long-term planning issues characterized by an uncertain and complex networked environment. The
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1amalgam of opponents in Afghanistan that confront ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom for
instance should be viewed as interdependent rather than independent, autonomous units. They
exchange information via communication networks, di®use weapons through tra±cking networks
and their Shura councils meet in a±liation networks. Understanding the e®ects of such a complex
operational environment and evaluating its social aspects thus becomes extremely important in
launching a successful counterinsurgency campaign, a fact recognized by the U.S. counterinsurgency
doctrine (Petreaus et al. 2007).
Knowledge of the structure of a covert organization is often obtained only after operations or
attacks have occurred. Additional empirical analysis of covert networks is di±cult as the nature of
data available on these systems is sparse, and even if such data exists it often is unstructured, messy,
inaccurate, incomplete and out of date (cf. Carley 2006). Therefore it is desirable to understand
and develop models of covert organizations that can function as a guide in pinpointing strengths
and weaknesses of such organizations. We argue that a combination of OR/MS tools related to
social network organization and decision analysis can be valuable in this respect.
Some attention has already been given to the use of OR/MS tools and experiments in the
domain of anti-terrorism planning, for instance in how to best respond to an anthrax attack (Craft
et al. 2005) or on using queuing theory to analyze scheduling policies in a surveillance system
to detect terrorists in time (Lin et al. 2009). Other examples include studies into the costs and
disruptions that might arise if U.S. domestic airlines adopted an antiterrorist measure aimed at
preventing baggage unaccompanied by passengers from traveling in aircraft luggage compartments
(Barnett et al. 2001) and models that identify resource-limited interdiction actions that maximally
delay the completion time of a nuclear's weapons project (Brown et al. 2009). What is clear from
the current war on terror is that many decision makers in law enforcement, the military and other
security organs face opponents of a nature quite di®erent than they were used to: asymmetrical,
irregularly operating groups and organizations. In this paper we present a new OR/MS related
tool that can function as a guide and benchmark for a speci¯c class of such hybrid organizations:
covert a±liation networks.
Traditional models of organizations do not fully apply to organizations such as Al Qaeda which
is said to have transformed from a hierarchical terrorist organization to a multifaceted `network
of networks' (Tucker 2001). Similarly Hamas abandoned its centralized, leadership structure and
2developed a compartmented organizational structure of sparsely overlapping cells (Gambill 2002).
More generally many covert organizations today, be they criminal, terrorist or insurgent, have
pro¯ted from the shift to networked organizational forms (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, Asal et al.
2007). These covert organizations assign tasks to cells to complete an operation. Furthermore
there is coordination and control among these cells to ensure operational succes. Even in case
of autonomous cell formation those cells need to be directed, i.e., they need strategic guidance
(Cruickshank and Hage Ali 2007). This covert organizational form has been studied mostly from
a qualitative perspective (see for instance Asal et al. 2007, Mishal 2005). Since it is important
to develop a more general framework in which the structure of a covert network can be predicted
and analyzed several formal models have been developed (McAllister 2004, McCormick and Owen
2000, Enders and Su 2007). What is recognized in this regard is the fact that the requirement
for secrecy distinguishes the covert organization from the overt organization (Baker and Faulkner
1993). Taking this dilemma explicitly into account Lindelauf et al. (2009) analyzed the problem
of covert network structure design from a multi objective optimization perspective. In this paper
we build upon this research by extending the analysis to the case of covert a±liation networks.
What we adopt from Lindelauf et al. (2009) is the method of measuring secrecy and information in
networks. Fundamentally di®erent and new is the restriction to the domain of covert cells modeled
by a±liation networks. We focus on a±liation in cells because covert organizations employ cells
consisting of several indiviuals needed to complete a task. Furthermore, these cells have to be
coordinated and controlled to better guarantee mission success. Common types of such cells are for
instance a command and control cell, a tactical operations cell, an intelligence cell and a logistics
cell (Nance, 2008).
Overt a±liation networks have been studied abundantly. Examples include interlocking boards
of directors (Levine, 1972; Mariolis, 1975; Mintz and Schwartz, 1981a,b; Allen, 1982; Bearden
and Mintz, 1987), club memberships (Bonacich, 1978) and social gatherings (Davis et al., 1941;
Breiger 1974). However very few, if any, a±liation network analysis has been done in the important
domain of covert networks taking the aspect of secrecy explicitly into account. In this paper we
will present a general framework to analyze covert cells by evaluating them on the basis of the
one-mode projection of the corresponding a±liation network.
Analyzing cell structured a±liation topologies is of twofold importance: it increases the un-
3derstanding of their structure and henceforth helps to improve strategies to counter them, and it
enables military organizations to optimize covert operations. Perhaps the best known example of a
covert operation conducted according to cell structured a±liations is provided by Al Qaeda's 9/11
operation. The organizational structure of the covert group conducting that operation equalled 4
cells of 19 people (Zwikael 2007). Additionally there was a command and control `cell' guiding the
operation, consisting of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Mohammed Atef and Osama Bin Laden. A
more historical, nation-state, example is the case of Israeli's operation Susannah (Johnson 2007,
Golan 1978). The belief among Israel's defense chiefs was that by conducting underground opera-
tions in Egypt its military regime could be shown to be insu±ciently reliable. Consequently it was
hoped for that the British decision to leave Egypt would be reconsidered. The covert network tasked
with conducting the attacks in Egypt consisted of two operational cells: one cell in Alexandria and
another one in Cairo. Command and control of these cells came from Israeli emissaries which can
be viewed as a third cell. The covert a±liation network conducting this operation can therefore
be seen to consist of three cells of varying size. After some initial operations the Alexandria cell
was detected by Egyptian intelligence and through observation and interrogation the Cairo cell
members were also uncovered and arrested. This incident illustrates the importance of being able
to evaluate several di®erent possible cell structures before conducting and creating an underground
network. We will analyze an explicit but hypothetical example of a covert organization wishing to
conduct an attack (cf. Frantz et al 2005).
Many current covert organizational structures can be seen to consist of cells organized in one of
several standard forms: a star, path or hybrid structure (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001). For instance
Mishal et al. (2005) present several topological examples in case of Islamic terrorist organizations
such as Hamas star like compartmentalization and Hizballah's in¯ltration of operatives into Israel
according to path like structures. More formally Frantz et al. (2005) discusses a characterization of
cellular networks. It is argued that often each cell in the network forms a clique, i.e., everybody in
the cell is connected to everybody else in the cell. The choice of adopting cellular structures clearly
is derived from maintaining secrecy and informational scrutiny. Assigning cell leaders and selecting
their interaction topology re°ects the desired span of control: central in case of a star topology and
becoming more decentralized in case of a path, ending up in a hybrid structures. In this paper we
will formalize these basic organizational structures of covert a±liation networks as they can serve
as a starting point for the analysis of more advanced a±liation networks. Thus we will explicitly
4de¯ne the star and path structures consisting of cells that are cliques. In addition we analyze a
hybrid structure, called a semi-complete network, consisting of a ring of cells whose leaders are
all interconnected. First we will characterize the total distance for the one-mode projections of
such a±liation networks. Subsequently we evaluate the secrecy, information and total performance
measure for the one-mode projection of these three standard covert a±liation structures. Based on
these covert a±liation network indicators we discuss optimality within the class of hypertrees and
present a procedure to restructure the a±liation network structure while improving the trade-o®
performance. Using this procedure we prove that uniform star a±liation networks are optimal in
balancing secrecy and information.
Section 2 discusses graph theoretical preliminaries and provides measures that capture the
notions of secrecy and information in covert organizations. In addition an example of a covert
organization is presented to illustrate the mathematical notation. Section 3.1 studies total distance
of one-mode projections of several basic hypergraphs. The computation of the total distance is
simpli¯ed by use of a proposition relating the total distance in a covert a±liation network to its
cell-shrinked version. The performance with regard to the information versus secrecy tradeo® of
the star, path and a hybrid a±liation structure is analyzed in section 3.2, and we compare their
performance to that of the example introduced previously. In addition we will show in section 4
that among all hypertrees of given order and size organizing the a±liation network according to a
star is optimal in balancing information and secrecy.
2 Mathematical Preliminaries
For a general overview of (hyper-)graph theory we refer to Bollobas (1986, 1998). Note that the
words graph and network will be used interchangeably throughout the text as well as the words
hypergraph and a±liation network.
A graph g is an ordered pair (N;E), where N represents the ¯nite set of playersa and the set of
edges E is a subset of the set of all unordered pairs of players. An edge fi;jg connects the players
i and j and is also denoted by ij. The order of a graph is the number of players jNj = n and
the size equals its number of edges jEj = m. The set of connected graphs of order jNj is denoted
aA player is modeled as a node in a graph and represents an individual terrorist, insurgent or criminal engaged in
a covert organization.
5by G(N). For V ½ N, the V -induced subgraph of g is the graph g0 = (V;E0) whose edge set E0
consists of all the edges ij 2 E of the original graph g that connect players i;j 2 V . The set
of neighbors of player i 2 N in graph g = (N;E) is indicated by ¡i(g) = fj 2 Njij 2 Eg. We
denote the degree of player i in a graph g by di(g) = j¡i(g)j. The shortest distance (measured by
the number of edges) between player i and j in a graph is called the geodesic distance between
i and j. The geodesic distance between players i;j in g 2 G(N) is denoted by lij(g). Clearly,
lij(g) = lji(g). We will write lij instead of lij(g) if there can be no confusion about the graph under
consideration. We set li(g) =
P
j2N lij(g). The total distance T(g) in the graph g = (N;E) is
de¯ned by T(g) =
P
i2N li(g).
A hypergraph or a±liation network H is a pair (N;X), where N is a ¯nite player set and
X ½ 2N is a collection of subsets of N. Elements of X are called events or cells. We denote
the set of cells a coalition of players S ½ N is engaged in by X(S) = fA 2 XjA \ S 6= ;g. A
player i 2 N that is a member of more than one cell, i.e., such that jX(fig)j ¸ 2, is called a cell
leader. We de¯ne the set of cell leaders in H by L(H). The order of a hypergraph is the number
of players jNj = n and the size equals its number of cells jXj = c. The set of all subsets of N
of size r is denoted by Nr. An r¡uniform hypergraph on N is a pair (N;X) where X ½ Nr.
The hypergraph (N;X) is connected if for every i;j 2 N there exists a sequence A1;:::;As of
cells with s ¸ 1, Al 2 X, for all l 2 f1;:::;sg, such that i 2 A1, j 2 As and At \ At+1 6= ; for
t = 1;:::;s ¡ 1. The class of all connected hypergraphs with player set N is denoted by C(N).
A cycle in a hypergraph H = (N;X) is a sequence A1;:::;As with s ¸ 3 of s ¡ 1 di®erent cells
Al 2 X, for all l 2 f1;:::;sg, such that Ai \ Ai+1 6= ; for i = 1;:::;s ¡ 1, A1 = As and Ai \ Aj = ;
otherwise. A connected hypergraph is a hypertree if it contains no cycles. The class of connected
a±liation networks in which each two cells have at most one player in common is denoted by
H(N) = f(N;X) 2 C(N)j jA \ Bj · 1 for all A;B 2 Xg. We denote the class of all r-uniform
hypergraphs in H(N) of size c by Hc
r(N), the class of all hypertrees in H(N) of size c by Hc
tree(N)
and the class of all r-uniform hypertrees in H(N) of size c is denoted by Hc
r¡tree(N). We de¯ne
the one-mode projection graph g?(H) = (N;EH) 2 G(N) corresponding to the a±liation network
H = (N;X) 2 H(N) by letting ij 2 EH if and only if there exists an A 2 X such that i;j 2 A.
Example 2.1 (cf. Frantz et al.)
Consider an organization wishing to carry out an attack with an explosive device. In addition
6assume that the organization has 16 individuals available to prepare for and conduct such an
attack. In preparing the attack several tasks have to be conducted, such as bomb building, delivery
of materials and ¯nances, target reconnaissance, target site preparation, etc. The organization
adopts a cellular structure by having each cell conduct one such task. We present a possible
a±liation structure for the preparation and planning of the attack as follows: we label the players
1 through 16 and assume that player 1,2,...,6 constitute the attack cell, player 7,8,...,12 the bomb
building cell, player 1 and 7 coordinate between the attack cell and the bomb building cell, player
13 coordinates the ¯nances with player 7, player 16 delivers the materials to player 10, player 14
conducts reconnaissance and delivers information on the target to player 12, and ¯nally player
15 prepares the target site and coordinates this with player 11. Note that this organizational
structure corresponds to an example of a covert network as introduced by Frantz et al. (2005). The
hypergraph corresponding to this organization is denoted by Hex = (N;X) with N = f1;2;:::;16g
and,
X = fA1;A2;:::;A7g
with cells A1 = f7;8;9;10;11;12g, A2 = f7;13g, A3 = f10;16g, A4 = f12;14g, A5 = f11;15g,
A6 = f1;7g and A7 = f1;2;3;4;5;6g. Clearly Hex 2 H7
tree and L(Hex) = f1;7;10;11;12g. The
















Figure 1: One-mode projection of the a±liation network of example 2.1.
7Next we formally de¯ne several standard a±liation networks representing basic covert network
organizational designs. In particular we model a cell in a covert organization as a cell in a hyper-
graph (cf. Frantz et al. 2005), and we consider a star, a path and a hybrid topology (cf. Arquilla
and Ronfeldt 2001).
Let H = (N;X) 2 Hc
r(N) be a hypergraph such that X = fAigc
i=1, c ¸ 2.
The hypergraph H is called an r-star, denoted by Hc
r¡star, if there is a l 2 N such that Ai\Aj = flg
for all i;j 2 f1;:::;cg with i 6= j. Observe that jL(Hc
r¡star)j = 1.
The hypergraph H is called an r-path, denoted by Hc
r¡path, if jAi\Ajj = 1 if and only if j = i+1
with i 2 f1;:::;c ¡ 1g. Obviously jL(Hc
r¡path)j = c ¡ 1.
For c ¸ 3, the hypergraph H is called an r-ring, denoted by Hc
r¡ring, if jAi \ Ajj = 1 if and
only if j = i + 1 with i 2 f1;:::;c ¡ 1g or i = c and j = 1. Observe that jL(Hc
r¡ring)j = c.
Finally we introduce a hybrid a±liation network in which cell leaders have an active coordinating
role. We do this by considering a ring structure where all cell leaders connect in one additional
cell.
Consider H = (N;X) 2 C(N) of size c + 1;c ¸ 3; with X = fAigc+1
i=1. The hypergraph H is
called r-semicomplete, denoted by Hc+1
r¡semicomp, if it satis¯es the following two properties:
(i) (N;fAigc
i=1) is an r-ring,
(ii) L((N;fAigc
i=1)) = Ac+1.
Note that typically Hc+1
r¡semicomp 62 H(N).
Figure 2: One-mode projections of H4
3¡star (left), H4
3¡path (middle) and H5
3¡semicomp(right).
In Table 1 we indicate the order and size of the one-mode projection graphs for the three
standard a±liation networks.
8g?(H) = (N;E) jNj = n jEj = m
H = Hc








r¡semicomp c(r ¡ 1)
c(r(r¡1)+c¡3)
2
Table 1: Order and size of the three one-mode projections of standard hypergraphs.
Finally we recall the de¯nitions of measures speci¯cally designed for the analysis of the interac-
tion structure of covert networks as introduced in Lindelauf et al. (2009). The average information
performance I(g) of a network g 2 G(N) with jNj = n is de¯ned as the normalized reciprocal of





It follows that 0 · I(g) · 1. The secrecy performance S(g) of a network g 2 G(N) with jNj = n
and size m is given by
S(g) =
n2 ¡ n ¡ 2m
n2 (2)
with 0 · S(g) · 1. Lindelauf et al. (2009) show that S(g) represents the expected fraction of
the network that `survives' given an uniform exposure probability distribution and the assumption
that upon exposure of individual i all individuals with which he is connected are also exposed.
Moreover it was argued on the basis of multi-objective optimization and bargaining theory that a
covert organization that wishes to balance the tradeo® between secrecy and information does best
by adopting a network g that maximizes the performance measure ¹, de¯ned by
¹(g) = S(g)I(g): (3)
3 One-mode Projection Analysis
3.1 Total distance
Computing the total distance of the one-mode projections g?(H) corresponding to a hypergraph H
can be cumbersome. We will prove that to compute the total distance in the one-mode projection
of r-uniform hypertrees one only needs to compute the total distances of a certain subset of its
9players. This subset arises from the so-called corresponding `cell-shrinked' version of the hypertree.
The cell shrinked graph g¡(H) corresponding to an r-uniform hypertree H = (N;X) 2 Hc
r¡tree(N)
is de¯ned as follows. For each A 2 X such that jA \ L(H)j = 1 we take exactly one representative
jA 2 A n L(H) and de¯ne R(H) = fjAjA 2 X;jA \ L(H)j = 1g. We set LR = L(H) [ R(H) and
de¯ne g¡(H) as the LR-induced subgraph of g?(H). See Figure 3 below for an illustration.
Figure 3: One-mode projection g?(H) (left) and its cell shrinked version g¡(H) (right), the leaders
are represented by solid dots and the representatives by bold line dots.
We relate the total distance in an r-uniform hypertree H = (N;X) to the total distance of the
players in its corresponding cell-shrinked version. For this aim de¯ne nA = jA\LRj for all A 2 X
and let





for all k 2 LR. Note that nA = 2 if jL(H) \ Aj = 1, and that nA ¸ 2 otherwise.
Proposition 3.1 Let H = (N;X) 2 Hc
r¡tree. Set g¡(H) = (LR;E). Then














(i) Consider j 2 N n LR and let A 2 X be the unique event such that j 2 A. Let k 2 LR \ A
and de¯ne Nk(j) = fz 2 N n fkgjlkz(g?(H)) < ljz(g?(H))g. It readily follows that






































































































Where the third equality follows from (i). 2
Proposition 3.2 Let H = (N;X) 2 Hc
r¡tree be such that nA = 2 for all A 2 X. Then
T(g?(H)) = (r ¡ 1)
X
k2LR







Since nA = 2 for all A 2 X it holds that g¡(H) is a tree. Hence, since every cell of g?(H)
contains r players it follows that
li(g?(H)) = (r ¡ 1)li(g¡(H)) for all i 2 LR:
and the result follows from Proposition 3.2(ii). 2
For the three standard types of hypergraphs the total distances of their one-mode projections
are provided in the lemma below.
11Lemma 3.1
(i) T(g?(Hc
r¡star)) = c(r ¡ 1)[r + 2(c ¡ 1)(r ¡ 1)]
(ii) T(g?(Hc
r¡path)) = c(r ¡ 1)(cr + 1
3c2r + 4




r¡semicomp)) = c(r ¡ 1)(3cr + 7 ¡ 5c ¡ 4r)
Proof:
(i) Consider H = Hc
r¡star and let i 2 N be the unique leader of H. Clearly i has distance 1 to
all other c(r ¡ 1) nodes, i.e.,
li(g?(H)) = c(r ¡ 1):
The nodes j 2 N nfig have distance 1 to each other member of the cell they belong to and distance
2 to the remaining nodes, hence
lj(g?(H)) = (r ¡ 1) + 2(c ¡ 1)(r ¡ 1)
for all j 2 N n fig. Consequently
T(g?(H)) = c(r ¡ 1) + c(r ¡ 1)[(r ¡ 1) + 2(c ¡ 1)(r ¡ 1)]
and the result follows.
(ii) Consider H = Hc
r¡path = (N;X). Since nA = 2 for all A 2 X we can use the result in
Proposition 3.2 to determine T(g?(H)). Let g = g¡(H) = (LR;E) with LR = L(H) [ R(H).
12Clearly jL(H)j = c ¡ 1 and jR(H)j = 2. Then
T(g?(H)) = (r ¡ 1)
X
k2LR





= (r ¡ 1)
X
k2L(H)
wk(H)lk(g) + (r ¡ 1)
X
k2R(H)




= (r ¡ 1)
X
k2L(H)








c(c ¡ 1)(r ¡ 2)(r ¡ 1)











c(c ¡ 1)(r ¡ 2)(r ¡ 1)
= (r ¡ 1)2[
c(c + 1)(c + 2)
3
¡ c(c + 1)] +
1
2
rc(r ¡ 1)(c + 1) +
1
2
c(c ¡ 1)(r ¡ 2)(r ¡ 1)
and the result follows. Note that the last equality follows from the fact that T(g) =
c(c+1)(c+2)
3 as
is derived in Lemma 2.1 of Lindelauf et al. (2009).
(iii) Consider H = Hc+1
r¡semicomp = (N;X). Take i 2 L(H). Clearly
li(g?(H)) = 1 ¢ (2(r ¡ 2) + c ¡ 1) + 2(c(r ¡ 1) ¡ 1 ¡ (2(r ¡ 2) + c ¡ 1))
= 2(c + 1)r + 6 ¡ 4r ¡ 3(c + 1):
Now take j 2 N n L(H). Then
lj(g?(H)) = 1 ¢ (r ¡ 1) + 2(c ¡ 2 + 2(r ¡ 2)) + 3(c(r ¡ 1) ¡ 1 ¡ (r ¡ 1 + c ¡ 2 + 2(r ¡ 2)))









= c[2(c + 1)r + 6 ¡ 4r ¡ 3(c + 1)] + c(r ¡ 2)[3(c + 1)r ¡ 4(c + 1) ¡ 7r + 9]
and the result follows. 2
133.2 Covert a±liation network performance
In analyzing covert a±liation networks their one-mode projection graphs can be seen to represent
the interaction structure among the members of the organization. In this section we analyze the





From the de¯nition of the information performance measure I as given in equation (1) together

























































Table 2: Asymptotic analysis of the information and secrecy performance measure.
From Lemma 3.2(i) and (ii) it follows that for su±ciently many cells, the star a±liation network
outperforms the path with regard to information performance. Intuitively this is clear: the distance
between cells in a star a±liation network is maximally 2 whereas it becomes increasingly more
14di±cult to reach other cells in case of a path a±liation structure. However, it can also be seen
that in case of a small number of cells the semi-complete hypergraph may outperform the star.
From Lemma 3.3 it can be seen that in case of a low value of r, i.e., small cells, the star a±liation
network outperforms the path and semi-complete hypergraph with regard to secrecy. From Table
2 it can also be seen that the star network outperforms the other networks asymptotically.














We compare the total performance of the star, path and semi-complete covert network a±liation
structures in Figure 4.
























Figure 4: Performance measure ¹ of Hc
r¡path ({), Hc
r¡star (x) and Hc+1
r¡semicomp (¢) as a function
of the number of cells c (horizontal axis) and the number of nodes r per cell. Top left: r=3, top
right: r=4, down left: r=5, down right: r=6.
It can be seen that the star a±liation network outperforms the other basic a±liation networks.
Example 3.1
In example 2.1 we introduced an organization wishing to carry out an attack. Seven tasks were
divided among as many cells. We compare the information, secrecy and trade-o® performance of
15the a±liation network Hex as presented in example 2.1 with that of comparable basic a±liation
networks. For this purpose we consider a star and path network consisting of 7 cells, i.e., H7
3¡star
and H7




3¡star 0:56 0:75 0:42
H = H7
3¡path 0:32 0:75 0:24
H = H8
3¡semicomp 0:56 0:57 0:32
H = Hex 0:44 0:66 0:29
Table 3: A comparison of the information, secrecy and total trade-o® performance in the setting
of example 2.1.
Both the star and semi-complete a±liation structures outperform the actual structure, whereas
the path a±liation network performs worse. This leads to the conclusion that, assuming that
secrecy and information are the most decisive parameters in conducting such a covert operation,
the organizational structure could be improved upon.
4 On optimal a±liation networks
The results in section 3 indicate that an r-star hypergraph is a good a±liation network for covert
organizations in terms of secrecy and information performance. This leads us to investigate the
performance of the star hypergraph a±liation network Hc
r¡star in more detail. In this section we
will show that the r-star outperforms all comparable hypertrees with the same number of cells
and of the same order. Before we formally state and prove this assertion in Theorem 4.1 we ¯rst
describe a `tree-to-star' transformation procedure.
Consider a hypertree H = (N;X) 2 Hc
tree, consisting of c cells, of possibly di®erent size. With
j;k 2 N, k 6= j, de¯ne
Nk(j) = fi 2 Njlki(g?(H)) < lji(g?(H))g
as the set of nodes closer to k than to j in the one-mode projection of H. The `tree-to-star'
transformation consists of the following ¯ve steps.
(1) Select A 2 X such that jA \ L(H)j > 1. Note if H is not a star, this is possible.
(2) Set A \ L(H) = fa1;:::;atg.
16(3) Set X1 = X.
(4) For i = 2 to t do
(i) set Bi = X(faig) n fAg,
(ii) for all C 2 Bi let ¹ C = (C n faig) [ fa1g,
(iii) let ¹ Bi = f ¹ CjC 2 Big,
(iv) set Xi = (Xi¡1 n Bi) [ ¹ Bi.
(5) Set X = Xt. If fA 2 XjjA \ L(H)j > 1g 6= ; return to step 1, otherwise stopb.
This procedure results in a hypergraph whose one-mode projection equals a star graph, possibly
with cells of di®erent sizes. We illustrate this procedure by an example.
Example 4.1: Let H = (N;X) with N = f1;2;:::;16g and
X = fA1;:::;A5g
with cells A1 = f1;2;3;15;16g, A2 = f3;4;5;11;14g, A3 = f5;6;7g, A4 = f7;8;9;10g and
A5 = f11;12;13g (see Figure 5 top left for g?(H)). Clearly L(H) = f3;5;7;11g. In step 1
select A = A2 with A2 \ L(H) = f5;11;3g and set a1 = 5, a2 = 11 and a3 = 3. Since
X(f11g) = fA2;A5g it follows that B2 = fA5g (step 4i) and we obtain ¹ A5 = f5;12;13g, ¹ B2 =
ff5;12;13gg and X2 = fA1;A2;A3;A4;f5;12;13gg (in Figure 5 top right the one-mode projec-
tion of this intermediate hypergraph is presented ). Similarly we ¯nd ¹ B3 = ff1;2;5;15;16gg and
X3 = ff1;2;5;15;16g;A2;A3;A4;f5;12;13gg. Now A3 \ L(H) = f5;7g, hence we return to step 1
and repeat. Choosing a1 = 5 and a2 = 7 results in the star H0 = (N;X0) with
X0 = ff3;4;5;11;14g;f1;2;5;15;16g;f5;6;7g;f5;8;9;10g;f5;12;13gg:
In Figure 5 bottom the resulting one-mode projection g?(H0) is presented.









































Figure 5: Illustration of the 'tree-to-star' transformation procedure in Example 4.1.
We now show that the r-star hypergraph maximizes the performance ¹ among all ¯xed size and
order hypertrees by ¯rst showing that each iteration in the `tree-to-star' transformation procedure
increases the value of ¹ for the corresponding hypergraph and second that among all star a±liation
networks with cells of di®erent sizes r-uniform ones are optimal.
Theorem 4.1 ¹(g?(Hc
r¡star)) ¸ ¹(g?(H)) for all H 2 Hc
tree of order n = (r ¡ 1)c + 1.
Proof:
Let H = (N;X) 2 Hc
tree with jNj = (r ¡ 1)c + 1 and apply the `tree-to-star' transformation
procedure. Denote the resulting star hypergraph by H0 = (N;X0). Note that every iteration of
steps 4 reduces the total distance in the corresponding one-mode projections (in fact within each
iteration i the total distance reduces by 2jNai(a1)j¢jNa1(ai)j). Since the size and order of the one-
mode projection remain constant during the transformation it follows that ¹(g?(H0)) > ¹(g?(H)).
Let g?(H0) = (N;E) with jEj = m. Note that there are exactly m pairs ij such that




¡ m pairs ij with lij(g?(H0)) = 2. Then,





¡ m)) = 2n(n ¡ 1) ¡ 2m:
18Therefore
¹(g?(H0)) =
(n2 ¡ n)(n2 ¡ n ¡ 2m)






(n2¡n¡m)2 < 0. Since m is minimal for Hc
r¡star it follows that
¹(g?(Hc
r¡star)) ¸ ¹(g?(H0)) 2
Theorem 4.1 shows that organizing cells in a r-star topology does well in balancing the trade-o®
between information and security. Clearly Hc
r¡star does not exist if n¡1
c is not integer. However
Theorem 4.1 can easily be extended to these cases by considering the star hypergraph `closest' to
Hc
r¡star: stars consisting of cells which di®er at most one in size.
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